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 48  
“WHAT DO I DO ABOUT THIS WORD, 
‘UNAVOIDABLE’?”: RESOLVING TEXTUAL 
AMBIGUITY IN THE NATIONAL 
CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT 
Jason LaFond*† 
Introduction 
The quote in the title of this Essay comes from Justice Breyer, express-
ing his frustration with the language of section 22(b)(1) of the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Justice Breyer made this comment during the 
October 12, 2010, oral argument in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.,1 a case about 
the availability of state tort claims based on vaccine design defects. The 
question before the Court was whether that section expressly preempts such 
claims against vaccine manufacturers “if the injury or death resulted from 
side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly 
prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”2 The 
answer depends on whether, as the Supreme Court of Georgia held, a court 
must make a case-by-case determination whether a side effect was “un-
avoidable” before a claim is preempted,3 or whether, as the Third Circuit 
held, Congress made a categorical determination that all side effects occur-
ring despite proper preparation and labeling are “unavoidable,” and that 
claims deriving from them are therefore preempted, eliminating all such 
design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers.4 
Every court that has confronted this issue has found the language drafted 
by Congress to be, as Justice Ginsburg said, “certainly, to say the least, 
confusing.” This Essay seeks to clear up some of that confusion, arguing 
that the language of § 22(b)(1), when closely analyzed, calls for the 
categorical approach adopted by the Third Circuit. Rather than anticipating 
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D., magna cum laude, University of Michigan Law School. Mr. LaFond is currently 
clerking at the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; in 2011, he will 
begin a clerkship at the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
 † Suggested citation: Jason LaFond, Commentary, “What Do I Do About This Word, ‘Un-
avoidable’?”: Resolving Textual Ambiguity in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 109 
Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 48 (2010), http://www. 
michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/lafond.pdf. 
 1. Oral Argument at p. 46, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-152, available at http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-152.pdf 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1). 
 3. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 140 (Ga. 2008). 
 4. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1734 (March 8, 2010). 
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a case-by-case analysis of unavoidability, the statute employs the word 
“unavoidable” as a term of art that establishes premises that when satisfied 
make a vaccine injury inherently “unavoidable.” This Essay argues Congress 
has demonstrated that it is willing to adopt this kind of categorical approach 
regarding the issue of unavoidability in other statutes. This Essay further 
argues that the text of § 22(b)(1), although muddled, supports a categorical 
approach, because it defines the premises that must be true in order for the 
conclusion of unavoidability to be reached.  
I. The Problem 
The Act created a National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to 
handle claims against manufacturers for vaccine-related injuries. This pro-
gram involves a no-fault scheme where claimants seek compensation from a 
“vaccine court.” If the claimant rejects the judgment of the vaccine court, 
she may pursue certain limited claims in state or federal court. The primary 
limit on such tort claims is that a claimant may not pursue a tort claim “if 
the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even 
though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper 
directions and warnings.” But what makes a side effect unavoidable? Loom-
ing in the background of this inquiry are thousands of potential lawsuits by 
parents of children with autism. These parents blame childhood vaccines for 
causing the disorder, but so far they have been turned away by the vaccine 
court because the court found the evidence linking vaccines to autism legal-
ly insufficient to establish causation.5 
At the outset, it certainly seems that the statute’s failure to define the 
word “unavoidable” is an invitation for case-by-case analysis. The conclu-
sion that an event is unavoidable can never be proven absolutely and is more 
properly labeled a judgment call. Judgment calls lend themselves very well 
to the close examination of circumstance. In the absence of a statutory defi-
nition, courts must examine the facts and circumstances of each case and 
consider the sum of nondecisive reasons in favor of an ad hoc conclusion as 
to whether a death was “unavoidable.” A court’s role is more limited, how-
ever, if the statute lists the premises that must be true in order to reach the 
conclusion at issue; in such a case, the court only determines whether those 
conditions are satisfied.   
The inquiry then becomes whether § 22(b)(1) adopted such a categorical 
approach to the question of unavoidability. The Bruesewitz family argued 
before the Court that a categorical interpretation would “render[] the entire 
concept of unavoidability surplusage” because Congress could have left out 
the term and just said that claims based on design defects were preempted if 
the vaccine was properly manufactured and contained proper warnings. 
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Alito responded that this reading would in 
turn render the words following “unavoidable”—”even though the vaccine 
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warn-
ings”—mere surplusage. But both the word “unavoidable” and the words 
following it do serve a purpose: “unavoidable” is a term of art in tort law for 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See, e.g., Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., No. 98-916V, 2009 WL 331968 
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009), aff’d, 89 Fed. Cl. 158 (2009), aff’d, 617 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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damages that are noncompensable.6 When it passed the Act, Congress em-
ployed this term of art to define which claims could not be brought outside 
of the vaccine court—i.e., those that were preempted. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed below, the words following “unavoidable” are premises that establish 
when an injury will be categorized as unavoidable. 
The court below in Bruesewitz did little to help the resolution of this 
problem when it unnecessarily complicated the issue. Rather than taking the 
language of the statute head-on, the Third Circuit held that the term “un-
avoidable” is not defined anywhere in the Act, and instead justified its 
conclusion that § 22(b)(1) is a categorical exclusion by referencing the Act’s 
structure, purpose, and legislative history. The Act’s structure and purpose 
are indeterminate, however, as noted in oral argument: the Act can be seen 
as designed to compensate those injured by vaccines, whose claims were 
largely denied in courts prior to the Act; and it can also be viewed as enact-
ing a policy choice to protect manufacturers from large, uncertain tort 
liability, thereby keeping prices low and keeping manufacturers in the mar-
ket. The legislative history is also of little guidance. One committee report 
suggests a categorical approach,7 while another suggests a case-by-case ap-
proach.8 Such conflicting aids to interpretation are in fact no aid at all. 
Fortunately, logic and context allow a textual analysis of § 22(b)(1) to 
“stand[] on its own, without need of (or indeed any assistance from)” these 
interpretive devices.9 Congress set the conditions that must be true · proper 
preparation, warnings, and directions—in order to reach the conclusion of 
unavoidability. This categorical proposition precludes a case-by-case ap-
proach.  
II. The Logic of Unavoidability 
“Unavoidable” describes an absolute state. This absolute state is a legal 
conclusion that can only be reached through logical reasoning. Three con-
trasting types of reasoning could lead to a conclusion of unavoidability. The 
first—reasoning from observation—is precluded because unavoidability, 
being in the form of a negative, requires an inordinate amount of observa-
tion before one can even come close to reaching an acceptable level of 
probable accuracy. This is what Kathleen Sullivan, attorney for Wyeth, de-
scribed in oral argument as “shadowboxing against an infinite number of 
theories about how there could have been a safer vaccine.” Anyone who has 
been asked to prove a negative understands this difficulty. 
Alternatively, the conclusion of unavoidability could be reached the 
same way that the conclusion of liability is reached: a court could look at 
facts, and then decide based on some legal standard whether some occur-
rence was unavoidable. This is classic case-by-case analysis; the approach 
which the Bruesewitz family asked the Court to adopt. A final way to reach 
this conclusion is to construct premises that, when true, definitionally yield 
                                                                                                                      
 6. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
 7. H.R. Rep. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 26 (1986). 
 8. H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, pt. 1, at 691 (1987). 
 9. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring). 
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the conclusion. This creates a shortcut around the time consuming, case-by-
case analysis: legislators make the judgment that if a, b, and c are true, con-
clusion x necessarily follows. Whether that proposition is accurate in the 
absolute sense is of no consequence. It is accurate in the legal sense—
because it passed both houses of Congress, was signed by the president, and 
is not unconstitutional. This truth in the legal sense is what matters. A court 
need only determine if the premises are true. This is the classic categorical 
approach—the approach sought by Wyeth, and the approach Congress 
adopted in § 22(b)(1): all events (injuries from side effects) that result from 
administration of any vaccine and satisfies the premises of the Act (proper 
preparation, proper directions, and proper warnings) are categorically “un-
avoidable.” 
III. Congress Is Comfortable Defining the Term “Unavoidable” 
Although finding that something is unavoidable may seem like a judg-
ment call naturally made by courts, Congress and agencies are comfortable 
making the categorical determination that when certain premises are true, 
events will be categorized as “unavoidable.” For example, an animal cruelty 
statute called the “28-hour law,” which was drafted in a similarly poor and 
redundant fashion, allowed animals in transport to be confined for more than 
28 hours only if off-loading was “prevented by storm or by other accidental 
or unavoidable causes which cannot be anticipated or avoided by the exer-
cise of due diligence and foresight.”10 Courts interpreting this language have 
held that when a transporter meets the specified conditions that follow the 
term “unavoidable,” he is within the defined universe of “unavoidable” and 
therefore exempt from the requirement.11 In other words, when the premises 
(exercise of due diligence and foresight) are true, the conclusion (excess 
confinement was unavoidable) follows. When the premises are not true, the 
conclusion does not follow.12 The statute called for and the courts applied a 
categorical approach. There was no need for case-by-case analysis, and none 
was used. This situation is similar to the proper analysis of “unavoidable” 
under the Vaccine Act: when facts establish that a vaccine was properly pre-
pared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings (like 
establishing due diligence under the 28-hour law), there is no further inquiry 
needed as to whether the resulting outcome was unavoidable. 
Agencies, using power delegated from Congress, also define premises 
that lead to the conclusion that an event is “unavoidable.” One patent statute, 
for example, says, “[t]he Director may accept the payment of any mainten-
ance fee . . . at any time after the six-month grace period if the delay is 
shown to the satisfaction of the Director to have been unavoidable.”13 The 
regulation interpreting this statute requires a patentee to show “that the de-
lay was unavoidable since reasonable care was taken to ensure that the 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Pub. L. No. 59-340, 34 Stat. 607–08 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 80502) (em-
phasis added). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 99 F.2d 635, 637 (1st Cir. 1938); Chica-
go, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. United States, 194 F. 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1912). 
 12. See Boston & Maine R.R., 117 F.2d at 427. 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
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maintenance fee would be paid timely. . . .”14 This regulation has been ap-
plied in a categorical fashion by courts: if the premise (reasonable care 
taken) is true, the conclusion (delay was unavoidable) will follow, and vice 
versa. In Ray v. Lehman, for example, the court noted, “the standard is un-
avoidable delay. . . . [I]n order to satisfy this standard, one must show that 
he exercised the due care of a reasonably prudent person.”15 Thus, in apply-
ing the phrase “unavoidable since reasonable care was taken,” the court only 
looks to see whether the premise is true. There are many other examples like 
this of agencies defining the premises that must be true for the conclusion of 
unavoidability to be reached.16 
IV. “Even Though” Has a Special Meaning 
when Used with “Unavoidable” 
The primary difficulty of a textual analysis in this case arises because of 
the use of “even though” in § 22(b)(1). “Even though” is a subordinating 
conjunction. A subordinating conjunction joins a subordinate clause to a 
main clause and is used to indicate the relationship between the two clauses. 
Different subordinating conjunctions show different relationships. For ex-
ample, they can be used to show cause or manner, indicate concession, fix a 
time, etc.17 In § 22(b)(1), as noted by the Third Circuit in Bruesewitz, “even 
though” connects the main clause, “side effects that were unavoidable”—
which, were it not for the second clause, could stand alone as a complete 
thought—to the subordinate clause, “the vaccine was properly prepared and 
was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.” As discussed above, 
when congressional drafters choose a categorical approach, they do so by 
constructing premises that when true yield the conclusion: finding the truth 
of the premises leads to acceptance of the conclusion. Thus, for § 22(b)(1) 
to be categorical, one must show that “even though” connects the conclusion 
(in the main clause) to the premises (in the subordinate clause) in a relation-
ship of causation; in other words, proper preparation, directions, and 
warnings leads to the conclusion that the side effect was unavoidable.  
The problem is that “even though” is not usually used as a subordinating 
conjunction to show cause. The most appropriate subordinating conjunc-
tions to show cause are words like “because,” “as,” and “since,”18 as was the 
case with the patent regulation discussed above (“unavoidable since”). The 
subordinating conjunction “even though,” on the other hand, is most proper-
ly used to indicate a relationship of concession between a main and a 
subordinate clause: the subordinate clause acknowledges something as true 
that makes the main clause appear to be an unexpected result. For example, 
the conjunction often appears in a definition that is conceded to be counte-
rintuitive: “A veteran shall be considered as living with a spouse, even 
                                                                                                                      
 14. 37 C.F.R. § 1.378(b)(3) (2010) (emphasis added).  
 15. 55 F.3d 606, 609 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 16. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 70.20; 7 C.F.R. § 457.167(11)(a); 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a)(2). 
 17. See Margaret Shertzer, The Elements of Grammar 46 (2001). 
 18. Id. 
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though they reside apart. . . .”19 The conjunction also often appears where 
there is a fact that is conceded to be relevant but should nonetheless be ig-
nored: “Amounts received in respect of the services of a child shall be 
included in his gross income and not in the gross income of the parent, even 
though such amounts are not received by the child.”20 Thus, the choice of the 
conjunction “even though” in § 22(b)(1) must be explained if a textual ar-
gument for a categorical approach is to be convincing. 
This strange use of “even though” can be explained, however, and it 
rests on the special nature of unavoidability. The premises put forward for a 
conclusion of unavoidability usually involve required precautions and an 
undesired event. When the premises are true—the required precautions have 
been taken—and the undesired event still occurs, the conclusion of unavoi-
dability follows. Thus, the relationship between the premises and the 
conclusion of unavoidability is in the form of a concession: the required 
precautions have been taken and nonetheless the event occurs. The precau-
tions taken make the occurrence of the undesired event a surprise; it is 
because the occurrence of the event, in the face of precautions, is a surprise 
that the label “unavoidable” is used in the first place. This inherent conces-
sion in reaching the conclusion that an event was “unavoidable” (the 
surprise that the undesired event occurred after precautions had been taken) 
explains the usage of “even though,” a concessionary subordinating con-
junction, in § 22(b)(1). An injury or death from a vaccine side effect 
occurring after proper preparation, directions, and warnings is a surprise, 
and it is because such injury or death is not expected that the injury or death 
is categorically labeled “unavoidable.”  
This explanation is confirmed by other instances where “even though” 
and “unavoidable” are juxtaposed. For example, under fish and wildlife reg-
ulations, a permit for programmatic (i.e., ongoing) eagle take (i.e., 
disturbance) will be granted when “the take is unavoidable even though ad-
vanced conservation practices are being implemented.”21 While no court has 
yet interpreted this regulation, the Department of the Interior has explained, 
in describing this rule, that the “even though” conjunction was used to show 
that the truth of the premises in the subordinating clause (“advanced conser-
vation practices are being implemented”) causes the conclusion in the main 
clause (“take is unavoidable”), and hence a permit may be issued. The De-
partment interpreted the statute allowing programmatic permits to be issued 
when “take is unavoidable even though advanced conservation practices are 
being implemented” to mean “[w]e can issue programmatic permits . . . 
based on implementation of ‘advanced conservation practices.’ ”22 Thus, the 
implementation of “advanced conservation practices” causes the take to fall 
under the umbrella of “unavoidable.” The “even though” language was used 
to show that the truth of the premises causes the conclusion, just as was 
done in § 22(b)(1). 
                                                                                                                      
 19. 38 U.S.C. § 1521(h)(2) (emphasis added). 
 20. 26 U.S.C. § 73(a) (emphasis added). 
 21. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).  
 22. 74 Fed. Reg. 46,841 (2009).  
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This usage of “even though” can also be found in the context of motor 
vehicle tort law. Many states label a motor vehicle accident “unavoidable” if 
it occurs even though ordinary care was used or no one was at fault. That is, 
the truth of the premise (ordinary care was used) causes the conclusion (the 
accident was unavoidable). In Batts v. Capps, for example, the Virginia 
Supreme Court analyzed a jury instruction defining the unavoidable 
accident doctrine: “the law recognizes that a collision between vehicles may 
be unavoidable even though the drivers are lawfully, properly and without 
negligence operating the same.”23 It is the concession that due care was used 
(premise true), and still the accident happened, that causes the conclusion 
(accident unavoidable). In describing the law under which the above jury 
instruction was formulated, the court in Batts confirmed the concessionary 
nature of the analysis and the causative nature of “even though”: “Where 
there is a reasonable theory of the evidence under which the parties involved 
may be held to have exercised due care notwithstanding that the accident 
occurred, an unavoidable accident instruction is proper and should be 
submitted to the jury.”24  
Conclusion 
The distinction between a categorical and case-by-case approach turns 
on the freedom given to courts. If a conclusion in the form of an ambiguous 
term such as “unavoidable” is left undefined, then it is up to courts to reason 
to conclusion by the gathering and aggregating of facts on a case-by-case 
basis. On the other hand, when Congress has outlined an approach by defin-
ing premises that, if true, will necessarily lead to the conclusion, courts are 
left only to apply that categorical proposition: they must determine if the 
premises are true; if they are, the conclusion follows. Congress has shown 
itself willing to set the premises of unavoidability and other instances of the 
phrase “unavoidable even though” show that it is used to set such premises. 
Once the somewhat muddled language of § 22(b)(1) is placed in this proper 
context, we can see that it creates just such a categorical proposition. When 
the premises defined by Congress are true—proper preparation, directions, 
and warnings—the conclusion must therefore follow—the side effect is un-
avoidable. 
                                                                                                                      
 23. 191 S.E.2d 227, 228 (Va. 1972) (emphasis added). 
 24. Id.; see also Sears v. Frost’s Administrator, 279 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Ky. 1955). 
